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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF
SPEECH-The United States Supreme Court held that Florida
Bar rules prohibiting attorneys from using direct mail to solicit
personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days of
an accident are constitutional and do not violate an attorney's
First Amendment rights.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
From 1987 to 1989, the Florida Bar conducted a study of
lawyer advertising' and solicitation2  within the State of
1. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995). Rule 7.2 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct outlined advertising as follows:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise
services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory,
newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or television, or
through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be
kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when
and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending
the lawyer's services except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of
advertisements or communications permitted by this rule and may pay the
usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal service organi-
zation.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name of
at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1989) (amended 1994).
2. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct outlines solicitation as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit profession-
al employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family
or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's
doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain-
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
by written or recorded communication or by in-person or telephone contact
even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to
be solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting profes-
sional employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal ser-
vices in a particular matter, and with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship, shall include the words "Advertising Material" on the
outside envelope and at the beginning and ending of any recorded communica-
tion.
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Florida.' The study found that Florida adults felt that lawyer
advertising encouraged frivolous lawsuits and belittled the legal
profession.4 As a result of the study, the Florida Bar petitioned
the Florida Supreme Court to amend the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar, Chapter 4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
with respect to lawyer advertising and solicitation.' The
proposed amendments were adopted with some modifications'
and became effective April 1, 1991
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may partici-
pate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization
not owned or directed by the lawyer which uses in-person or telephone contact
to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not
known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1989).
3. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. Included in the study were: 1) results of
statewide hearings; 2) the results of a public opinion survey; and 3) a compilation of
public commentary on attorney advertising. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3,
Went For It (No. 94-226). The public polling organization was also retained to com-
pile statistics regarding the pubic's perception and attitudes toward solicitation and
advertising by attorneys. Id.
4. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Went For It (No. 94-226). The study
also found that much of the Florida news media condemned lawyer advertising in
general, and particularly the solicitation of recent accident victims and their families.
Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 3 (citing The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990) (approving the modi-
fications to the rules petitioned by the Florida Bar)). The Florida Supreme Court
received a complete version of the study with the petition to amend. Id.
6. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (citing The Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at
451). Two of the amendments were at issue in Went For It. Id. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(A)
provides that:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of himself,
his firm, his partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the
lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client
for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if.
(a) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving
the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of
that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days
prior to the mailing of the communication.
The Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at 466. Rule 4-7.8(a) provides that:
[A] lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the
service: (1) engages in no communication with the public and in no direct
contact with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the law-
yer.
Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. In combination, these rules prohibit lawyers from
directly or indirectly contacting accident victims or their families by direct mail
within 30 'days after an accident. Id.
7. See McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1544 (M.D. Fla. 1992)
(holding that the Florida Bar rule which prohibited personal injury and wrongful
death-targeted direct mail lawyer advertising and lawyer referral for thirty days fol-
lowing an accident was unconstitutional), aftd, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd
sub nom. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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In March of 1992, G. Stewart McHenry ("McHenry") and his
wholly owned lawyer referral corporation, Went For It, Inc.
('WFI"), filed suit against the Florida Bar (the "Bar") and
Assistant Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar, Susan V.
Bloemendaal ("Bloemendaal"), in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida.8 The district court
referred the parties' competing summary judgment9 motions to
a magistrate judge who,1" in turn, recommended that
McHenry's motion for summary judgment be denied and that
the Bar's motion for summary judgment be granted." The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
rejected the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge,
granted McHenry's motion for summary judgment and denied
the Bar's motion for summary judgment. 2 The Bar appealed
8. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1543. McHenry, as a member of the Florida
Bar, had a history of sending direct mail advertisements to personal injury victims
to solicit legal clients. Id. at 1545 n.1. In conflict with the disputed rules, McHenry
wanted to continue direct mail solicitation to personal injury victims. Id. On October
24, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court disbarred McHenry, rendering moot the action
as to McHenry. Id. at 1545. However, a case and controversy remained between
Went For It, Inc. ("WFI") and the Florida Bar. Id.
9. Summary judgment is defined as a "[pirocedural device available for
prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without trial when there is no dis-
pute as to either material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if
only question of law is involved." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. Upon McHenry's motion for summary
judgment and the Bar's cross-motion for summary judgment, this case was referred
to, and heard by, the Honorable Charles R. Wilson, a United States Magistrate
Judge. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1544. Judge Wilson was authorized to hear the
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988) (providing authority for a federal
judge to designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter)
and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (requiring a magistrate judge to
promptly conduct nondispositive pretrial proceedings when referred). Id. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. Crv. P. 72.
11. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1544. Judge Wilson found that, as a matter of
law, Florida Bar Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(A) and Florida Bar Rule 4-7.8 do not violate the
First or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. The First
Amendment to the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1548. The district court concluded that the chal-
lenged rules substantially impair the availability of truthful and relevant informa-
tion, which could make a positive contribution to consumers in need of legal servic-
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the district court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.1" On May 10, 1994, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of WFI.L On September 26, 1994, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 to address the issue
of whether Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7.8(a) of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar" violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice
O'Connor, began by noting that it is now established law in the
United States that attorney advertising qualifies as "commercial
speech" for the purposes of the First Amendment and, as such,
should be accorded a measure of First Amendment protection.
17
es. Id. The district court held that, as a matter of law, the Florida Bar's thirty-day
ban on targeted direct mail lawyer advertising violates the First, Fifth, and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. Following the declaratory
judgment of the district court, the Bar agreed that it would not enforce the thirty-
day rule during the pendency of appellate proceedings. Brief for Respondents at 3
n.6, Went For It (No. 94-226).
13. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). WFI moved to add John T.
Blakely as a plaintiff, as his allegations were identical to McHenry's. Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 6, Went For It (No. 94-226). The case was remanded to the
district court for consideration of the motion; the motion was granted and Blakely
was added as a plaintiff. Id.
14. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1045. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, because
the rules in question only prohibit solicitation for wrongful death or personal injury
clients, the rules are not content-neutral; accordingly, they are not a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Id. Justice Black, the author of the
opinion, expressed his disfavor with the conclusion the court reached in this case. Id.
15. Florida Bar v. McHenry, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994) (granting certiorari).
16. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) provides:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of himself,
his firm, his partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or
his firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment if: (a) the written communication concerns
an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an acci-
dent or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed
or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more
than thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication; (b) the written
communication concerns a specific matter and the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the person to whom the communication is directed is repre-
sented by a lawyer in the matter; (c) it has been made known to the lawyer
that the person does not want to receive such communications from the law-
yer; (d) the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, ha-
rassment, intimidation, or undue influence; (e) the communication contains a
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or unfair statement or claim or is
improper under rule 4-7.1; or (f) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it unlikely
that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.
The Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at 466-67. Rule 4-7.8(a) outlines identical prohibitions
for lawyer referral services. Id.
17. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2375. Joining Justice O'Connor in the majority
1232
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However, the Court further stated that such First Amendment
protection is not absolute, and commercial speech may be subject
to regulations which otherwise would be impermissible with
noncommercial speech. 8 Finally, the Court indicated that it
would examine the instant case under the framework of Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.9
The Court outlined the Central Hudson test--commercial
speech can be regulated if the government demonstrates that: 1)
it has a substantial interest in regulating the commercial
speech; 2) its substantial interest is "directly and materially"
advanced by the restriction; and 3) the regulation was "narrowly
drawn."0 The Central Hudson test required the Court to use
"intermediate" scrutiny in analyzing the Florida Bar rules.21
Under Central Hudson, if commercial speech concerns unlawful
activity or the speech is misleading, it may be regulated.2
Under the first prong, the Court found that the state had a
substantial interest in regulating the practice of professions.'
were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Breyer. Id. at 2373.
Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2381 The Court relied on and cited the following: Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding that a state may prohibit so-
licitation through the medium of direct mail to potential clients known to face a
particular legal problem), Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
637 (1985) (holding that an attorney may not be prohibited by a state from engaging
in printed advertising for the purpose of soliciting clients when the advertising con-
tains truthful and nondeceptive information and is directed at specific legal rights of
potential clients) and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982) (holding that a state
advertising rule prohibiting lawyers from deviating from precise listing requirements,
listing jurisdictions licensed to practice in, and mailing announcement cards to the
public violates the First Amendment when there is no showing of misleading adver-
tising or that mailings would be sufficiently difficult to supervise). Id. at 2375.
18. Id. at 2375. The Court cited Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477
(1989) (holding that state regulation of commercial speech is not required to be the
least restrictive means to achieve the desired end) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that a state may prohibit direct, per-
son-to-person solicitation by attorneys)). Id.
19. 447 U.S. 557, 561, 571-72 (1980) (holding that the promotional advertising
of an electric utility is protected commercial speech, that the state failed to show an
adequate interest to restrict such speech, and that the state's suppression of the
speech was overextensive and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
20. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-
65).
21. Id. at 2375.
22. Id. at 2376.
23. Id. The Court based its finding on the general acceptance of the compel-
ling interest of a state in the professions within its boundaries and in protecting
public health, safety, and professional standards. Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (holding that a state may prohibit direct, per-
son-to-person solicitation by attorneys), Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee schedule for title examinations published by
a county bar constitutes price fixing and violates the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
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The Court concluded that the Bar satisfied the second prong
based on the results of the 1987-1989 study conducted by the
Bar.? The Court determined that the Bar had made a
significant showing for advancing its interests. 25 Finally, the
Court examined the relationship between the state's interests
and the regulations and determined that Florida's regulations
satisfied the third prong.6
(1994)) and Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid a state from making an attorney's refusal to answer a
bar inquiry's questions regarding professional conduct a per se ground for disbar-
ment)). The Court also stressed that the protection of potential clients' privacies is a
substantial state interest. Id at 2376-77 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769
(1993) (holding that a state cannot ban in-person solicitation by Certified Public Ac-
countants ("CPA's") when a CPA-proposed communication to potential clients is
truthful, nondeceptive information proposing a lawful commercial transaction), Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (holding that a municipal ordinance prohibit-
ing picketing before or about a residence or dwelling of an individual served a sig-
nificant governmental interest in protecting residential privacy, was narrowly tailored
and did not violate the First Amendment) and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471
(1980) (holding that a statute prohibiting picketing of residences or dwellings, but
exempting peaceful picketing of a place of employment during a labor dispute, denies
equal protection)).
24. Id. at 2378. The Bar submitted a 106 page summary of the study to the
district court. Id. at 2377. The summary contained data supporting the Bar's posi-
tion that the general public of the State of Florida believed that direct mail solici-
tations after an accident were an invasion of privacy and detrimental to the percep-
tion of the profession. Id. The summary provided: As of June 1989, attorneys mailed
700,000 direct solicitations annually in Florida, 40% of which were directly aimed at
accident victims or their survivors. Id. Fifty-four percent surveyed believed that
soliciting persons involved in accidents was a violation of privacy. Id. A random
sampling of those who were solicited by direct mail advertising from lawyers in 1987
showed that 45% thought that such practice was "designed to take advantage of
gullible or unstable people." Id. Thirty-four percent thought such practices were
.annoying or irritating." Id. Twenty-six percent found the practice "an invasion of
your privacy." Id. Twenty-four percent said that it made them angry. Id. Finally,
27% of those contacted by direct mail reported that their regard for attorneys and
the entire judicial process was lower due to receiving the mail. Id. The summary
also included anecdotal evidence, newspaper clippings and pages of excerpts of com-
plaints from people who had been solicited by direct mail by lawyers. Id. WFI failed
to refute any of the aforementioned. Id. at 2378.
25. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court found that the ban on targeted
mailing was sufficient to pass the second prong because it did not prohibit lawyers
from advertising generally in newspapers, but rather sought to specifically protect
the privacy of those individuals whose "wounds are still open." Id. at 2379. This was
contrary to the approach taken by the court of appeals, which held that a targeted
letter does not invade an individual's privacy any more than an at-large letter
would. Id. at 2378 (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)).
The Court found that the concern of the Bar was the effect the mailing had on the
profession. Id. at 2379. It was not enough, according to the Court, to simply not
read the letter. Id.
26. Id. at 2380-81. The Court was unpersuaded by WFI's argument that the
rules are unconstitutionally overinclusive. Id. The Court did not find it necessary
that the ban distinguished among potential clients based on the severity of the inju-
ry or grief. Id. at 2380. The Court stated that the Bar's rules are well-tailored to
1234
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The Court concluded that the rules in question, restricting
Florida lawyers from using targeted direct-mail solicitation of
accident victims and their families within thirty days of an
accident, satisfied the Central Hudson test.' In so concluding,
the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.28
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that
attorney advertising is speech protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 9 Justice Kennedy argued that it is
necessary, in the aftermath of an accident, to investigate
quickly." Justice Kennedy further noted that a failure to do so
or to find legal representation could actually harm the
individuals whom the rules in question were designed to
protect.3" However, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority
that the three-pronged Central Hudson test was applicable to
the instant case.32
The dissent concluded that the State of Florida had failed to
demonstrate a substantial interest in banning targeted direct-
mail lawyer advertising.33 The dissent also noted that the
the objective of eliminating the type of targeted mailings which were hurting the
legal profession. Id. The Court also discussed, at length, other types of options avail-
able to attorneys to communicate their services to the general public and concluded
that the ban did not disrupt any of these other types of available communication.
Id. at 2380-81.
27. Id. at 2381.
28. Id.
29. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was joined in his dissent by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. The dissenting opinion was based on the
constitutional protection of free speech outlined by the Court in Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a state may not establish a blanket ban on attor-
ney advertising for routine legal services). Id.
30. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2382.
31. Id.
32. Id, Justice Kennedy's dissent asserted that the majority had oversimplified
that the advertising in question was simply commercial speech. Id. In addition, Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted the dissent's belief that many banned communications could
be vital to those solicited in establishing their rights. Id. at 2381. Finally, Justice
Kennedy also stressed the importance in applying McHenry's commercial speech with
care and fidelity to the existing precedents. Id. at 2382.
33. Id. at 2382-83. The dissent relied on the Court's ruling in Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), which distinguished between direct in-per-
son solicitations and direct-mail solicitations. Id. at 2382. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at
475-76. The Court in Shapero found no dangers present in direct mail advertising,
and held that the "relevant inquiry is not whether there exist potential clients
whose 'condition' makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode
of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such suscepti-
bility." Id. at 474. The dissent believed this case was no different, and stated that
restrictions on speech could not be justified because a listener might be offended.
Went For It, 115 S. Ct at 2382-83. Likewise, the dissent rejected the majority's
opinion that the state had an interest in protecting the reputation of the profession,
stating that any restriction on these grounds is pure censorship. Id. at 2383.
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regulation failed the second prong of the test because the state
had failed to effectively demonstrate the existence of real
danger.34 The dissent also concluded that, although it would
have been inappropriate to examine the third part of the Central
Hudson test in this case because of the failure to meet the other
prongs' requirements, the relationship between the Bar's
interests and the solution chosen would not have provided a
reasonable approach to a viable solution.35 In concluding, the
dissent criticized the majority's opinion for retreating from the
constitutional guarantees afforded commercial speech in order to
protect the legal profession.3
The concept of constitutional protection for attorney
advertising, or for any type of commercial speech, is a recent
legal development. 7 The Supreme Court first examined the
constitutional implications of regulating commercial speech in
1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen."8 In Valentine, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a New York Sanitary Code
provision39 which forbade distribution of commercial and
business advertising material in the streets." The Court
34. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2383-84. The dissent concluded that the "Sum-
mary of Record" (the summary of the 2-year study conducted by the Florida Bar and
submitted to the district court) relied on by the majority was flawed, that it was
filled with invalidated studies, that it did not effectively question the problem with
regard to direct-mail solicitations, and that nothing in the summary indicated that
the reputation of the legal profession would be aided by the rules in question. Id. at
2384.
35. Id. at 2384. The dissent concluded that there was no basis for assuming
that an attorney's advice would be unwelcome by a majority of people when it was
necessary to begin the assessment of legal rights in a rational manner. Id. at 2385.
The dissent concluded that the time immediately following an injury is the most
important time for a person injured to know that legal advice is available, and that
those who most need legal advice may fail to obtain it. Id.
36. Id. at 2386. The dissent declared that the Constitution does not allow the
suppression of information regarding the legal profession in order to advance a
state's interest in promoting lawyers' public image. Id. The dissent also declared
that the majority opinion validated the Bar's censorship. Id.
37. Id. at 2375.
38. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
39. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53. New York Sanitary Code § 318 provided:
Handbills, cards and circulars.-No person shall throw, cast or distribute or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card,
booklet, placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street
or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the
vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letter-box therein; provided that
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the
delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit
the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or
by annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful dis-
tribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id. at 53 n.1.
40. Id. at 53. Chrestensen attempted to distribute double-sided handbills which
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reasoned that states and municipalities may impose some
regulation on the privilege of free speech in the name of public
interest, but any such regulation may not unduly burden or
proscribe an organization's employment in the streets.4 1
However, the Court held that there is no constitutional
protection which restrains state governments from regulating
speech which is "purely commercial advertising," and that any
determination of whether an individual may promote or pursue
an occupation in the streets, and to what extent, is a matter for
state legislatures. 2
The broad rule established by the Court in Valentine
remained the law until the Court shifted direction in 1976 in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.'s In Virginia State Board, the Court examined the
constitutionality of a portion of the Virginia Code," which
prohibited a Virginia licensed pharmacist from publishing or
advertising, in any manner, any fee, price, discount, rebate or
credit on any prescription drug.' The question before the Court
contained, on one side, commercial advertising for an exhibit of a United States
Navy submarine moored in the East River of New York City; the other side con-
tained a protest against the City Dock Department for not allowing Chrestensen to
use city wharfage facilities for the submarine. Id. Upon attempting to distribute the
handbills, Valentine, the Police Commissioner, restrained Chrestensen. Id.
Chrestensen then filed suit to enjoin Valentine from interfering with the distribution
of the handbills. Id. at 54.
41. Id. at 54.
42. Id.
43. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
44. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 752. The Virginia Code provided in
pertinent part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who (1) is
found guilty of any crime involving grave moral turpitude, or is guilty of fraud
or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration; or (2) issues, publishes,
broadcasts by radio, or otherwise, or distributes or uses in any way whatsoev-
er advertising matter in which statements are made about his professional
service which have a tendency to deceive or defraud the public, contrary to
the public health and welfare; or (3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly
or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium,
discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs contain-
ing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974) (repealed 1988).
45. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 749-50. The claim was brought by a Vir-
ginia resident, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (the "VCCC") and the
Virginia State AFL-CIO. Id. at 753-54 n.10. The VCCC's claim was that VCCC mem-
bers had a First Amendment right, as users of prescription drugs, to receive infor-
mation from pharmacists concerning their drug prices. Id. at 753-54. This case repre-
sented the second constitutional challenge to this section of the Virginia Code. Id. at
753. In Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969), the court
held that a state could ban prescription drug advertising by pharmacists of prices
and terms of sale, but could not employ the ban to fix prescription drug prices and
upheld a prohibition on drug price advertising. Patterson Drug Co., 305 F. Supp. at
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was whether a pharmacist's communication regarding a
particular drug's price to a customer falls outside the protection
of the First Amendment." The Court held that commercial
speech of this kind is indeed protected under the First
Amendment and in so holding, the Court invalidated the
Virginia statute."7 However, in holding that commercial speech
enjoys protection under the First Amendment, the Court
clarified that its holding does not prohibit all regulation of
commercial speech in all circumstances." In so clarifying, the
Court stated that it is constitutionally acceptable to regulate
commercial speech if it is done as a mere restriction on time,
place and manner.9 The Court concluded by limiting the
application of its holding to advertising by pharmacists."
823. The challenge in Patterson Drug Co. was primarily based on the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the First
Amendment. Id. The challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, coupled with the
interests of a pharmacist and a drug retailing company, was enough for the three-
judge district court panel to uphold the prohibition. Id. at 827.
46. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 761. Specifically, the Court stated: "Our
question is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction,' is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas,' and from 'truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the adminis-
tration of Government,' that it lacks all protection." Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (holding that mu-
nicipal human relations ordinances which prohibit newspapers from carrying gender
designated advertising columns for nonexempt job opportunities does not violate the
newspaper publishers' First Amendment rights), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) (holding that a federal obscenity statute punishing the mailing of ma-
terial that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy, or other publications of an indecent
character, and a California obscenity statute making punishable, inter alia, the keep-
ing for sale or advertising of material that is obscene or indecent, does not offend
constitutional safeguards against convictions based on protected material; nor do
these statutes violate constitutional requirements of due process by failing to give
adequate notice of what is prohibited) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (holding that a New Hampshire statute prohibiting the addressing of
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any
street or other public place, or calling said person by any offensive or derisive name
is not unconstitutional)).
47. Id. at 762. The Court found that the justifications given by the Virginia
State Board for the restrictions failed to outweigh the public's First Amendment
rights to the information in question- Id. at 770. The Court stated: "What is at issue
is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we conclude that the an-
swer to this one is in the negative." Id. at 773.
48. Id. at 770.
49. Id. at 771. The Court further stated that it had previously approved re-
strictions of the aforementioned type if: 1) there was sufficient justification for the
restriction without reference to the content of the regulated speech; 2) the govern-
ment could show the restriction advanced a significant governmental interest; and 3)
the restriction allowed the dissemination of the information through "ample alterna-
tive channels." Id.
50. Id. at 773 n.25. The Court stated:
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In the year following the Virginia State Board decision, the
Court applied the principles it had outlined with respect to
pharmacists to invalidate an Arizona Bar rule prohibiting
attorneys from advertising in newspapers and other forms of
media.51 In Bates v. State Bar,52 the Court addressed the issue
of whether a state may constitutionally prohibit an attorney
from publishing truthful advertising relating to the availability
and costs of routine legal services in a newspaper.53 In Bates,
attorneys Bates and O'Steen placed an advertisement in a daily
newspaper offering "legal services at very reasonable fees.""
The advertisement violated the rules prohibiting advertising by
attorneys established by the Arizona Bar.5 The Court held that
attorney advertising may not be subjected to a blanket
suppression of the kind attempted by the Arizona Bar, and
stated that attorney advertising cannot be restrained from the
flow of information." However, the Court once again limited its
holding and indicated that its decision could not be used to
invalidate all forms of attorney advertising regulations.57
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other profes-
sions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may re-
quire consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for ex-
ample, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services
of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility
for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of adver-
tising.
Id.
51. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2375 (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977)).
52. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
53. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
54. Id. at 354. Bates and O'Steen placed the advertisement in the Arizona
Republic, a daily newspaper generally circulated in the Phoenix metropolitan area.
Id- The advertisement stated that Bates and O'Steen were offering "legal services at
very reasonable fees" and listed various services, including uncontested divorces,
adoptions, bankruptcy proceedings and name changes. Id. at 385.
55. See Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme
Court of Arizona, 17A ARIz. REV. STAT. at 26 (Supp. 1976) (repealed and replaced by
Rule 42 of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. at ER 7.2 (1995)).
The rule provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertise-
ments in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial public-
ity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id.
56. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384-85.
57. Id. at 383. The Court allowed regulation of certain advertising. Id. A
state can still regulate any advertising by attorneys that is "false, deceptive, or mis-
leading." Id. A state can still require warnings or disclaimers to accompany attor-
ney advertisements. Id. at 384. A state may also restrict, within reason, the "time,
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The Court's reservation on the question of the permissible
scope of regulating attorney advertising allowed the Court to
change course in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.5" The Court
considered, in Ohralik, whether the constitutional protections
established in Bates apply to the solicitation of clients by an
attorney through direct, in-person contact. 9 In Ohralik, an
attorney, upon learning of an automobile accident, contacted the
accident victim's parents to solicit their daughter as a client and
later proceeded to the hospital to contact the victim to secure
her case.6" Ohralik also sought out a second victim, utilized a
concealed tape recorder, and told her that the first victim's
insurance policy contained provisions which could provide her
recovery of her damages." The Court held that the type of face-
to-face confrontation engaged in by Ohralik may be prohibited
without constitutional conflict because it demonstrates the
potential for problems with attorney solicitation and because the
state had shown a substantial interest in protecting the rights of
the public.6 2
place and manner of advertising." Id. Any advertising with regard to illegal trans-
actions may be prohibited. Id. Finally, any 'special problems" encountered in tele-
vision advertising can justify special restrictions. Id.
58. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
59. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
60. Id. at 449-50. Ohralik was a lawyer and a member of the Ohio Bar. Id. at
449. Ohralik became aware of an automobile accident which had occurred 11 days
prior involving a young woman with whom Ohralik was casually acquainted, Carol
McClintock ("McClintock"). Id. McClintock had been injured in the accident. Id.
Ohralik proceeded to telephone the woman's parents and they agreed to visit with
him as a prerequisite to his visiting McClintock. Id. After a short visit with the par-
ents, Ohralik was informed that the decision on whether or not to hire him as
McClintock's attorney was her choice. Id. Ohralik proceeded to the hospital where he
met with McClintock, and she informed him that she would not enter into any
agreement with him for his services without first discussing the matter with her
parents. Id. Ohralik returned to the parents' home where he was informed that
McClintock had assented to his representation. Id. Meanwhile, Ohralik visited the
home of Wanda Lou Holbert ("Holbert"), another person in the car with McClintock
at the time of the accident, without an invitation. Id. at 451. Ohralik concealed a
tape recorder under his coat and informed Holbert that McClintock's insurance policy
contained a provision against uninsured motorists which might provide Holbert with
damages. Id. Ohralik offered to represent Holbert for a contingent fee of one-third of
any recovery, and Holbert agreed, but stated that she was confused by what was
happening. id. Holbert attempted to sever the relationship with Obralik the next
day and McClintock eventually discharged Ohralik. Id. at 452. Holbert eventually
paid Ohralik one-third of her recovery in settlement after he filed a breach of con-
tract suit against her. Id. McClintock and Holbert filed complaints against Ohralik
with the Geauga County Bar Association's Grievance Committee. Id. Ohralik was in-
definitely suspended by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which found that his conduct
was not protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 453-54L
61. Id. at 450-51.
62. Id. at 468. The Court stated: 'The facts in this case present a striking
example of the potential for overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's in-person so-
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The Court's decision in Ohralik became clearly defined by a
case decided the same day. In In re Primus,"3 the Court
considered whether a state may prohibit an attorney from
advising a lay person of the person's legal rights and disclosing
in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from
a nonprofit organization with which the attorney is
associated.' The Court considered the relevance of soliciting
clients, not for pecuniary self-interest, but to advance political
and ideological goals.6" In Primus, an attorney associated with
the American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU") spoke to a
group of women, advising them of their legal rights.6s Primus
later sent a letter to one of the women advising her that the
ACLU would provide free legal assistance in the event that she
chose to file suit.67 The Court distinguished Primus from
licitation of professional employment. They also demonstrate the need for prophylac-
tic regulation in furtherance of the State's interest in protecting the lay public." Id.
The Court stated that an individual targeted by a lawyer is more easily influenced
and overly vulnerable. Id. at 465. Under these circumstances, the lawyer's invasion
of the individual's privacy may cause distress. Id. Thus, the Court stated, under
these circumstances, the lawyer may upset the individual simply by solicitation. Id
This, the Court noted, allows the presumption that such conduct by lawyers will
cause injury to the solicited individual. Id. at 466.
63. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
64. Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 415-16. Primus was a lawyer associated with the American Civil
Liberties Union (the "ACLU") in Columbia, South Carolina Id. at 414. During the
Summer of 1973, there were local and national newspaper reports that in Aiken,
South Carolina, pregnant mothers on public assistance were being sterilized or
threatened with sterilization in order for them to receive medical care under the
Medicaid program. Id. at 415. Concerned by this, local businessman Gary Allen
("Allen") arranged for Primus to meet with some of the women who had been steril-
ized to address any concerns they might have had about their legal rights. Id. Mary
Etta Williams attended the meeting at Allen's bequest because she had been steril-
ized by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce after the birth of her third child. Id. At the meeting,
Primus advised the women, including Williams, of their rights and raised the possi-
bility of a lawsuit. Id. at 416.
67. Id. at 416-17. The ACLU informed Primus early in August of 1973 of its
willingness to represent Aiken mothers who had been sterilized. Id. at 416. Primus
was notified by Allen that Williams wanted to file suit. Id. As such, Primus sent a
letter dated August 30, 1973 to Williams, notifying her of the ACLU's offer of free
legal assistance. id. at 416-17. After receiving Primus' letter, Williams visited Dr.
Pierce, and at his lawyer's request, signed a letter releasing the doctor of any liabili-
ty. Id. at 417. Williams then showed the doctor's lawyer Primus' letter, and they re-
tained a copy. Id. Williams called Primus to tell her that she no longer wished to
sue. Id. As a result of the letter, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (the "Board") filed
a formal complaint against Primus, alleging that Primus had solicited in violation of
the Canons of Ethics. Id. On March 20, 1975, the complaint was heard by a panel
of the Board. Id. The panel recommended that Primus be found guilty of soliciting
Williams and that a private reprimand be issued. Id. at 418-19. A decision by the
full Board followed the findings of the panel. Id. at 421. The Supreme Court of
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Ohralik and held that the letter was protected by the First
Amendment and that when political expression or association is
at issue, a greater precision of regulation is required than when
the conduct is purely commercial. 8 The Court limited the
opinion to the associational freedoms characteristic of nonprofit
organizations.69
In 1980, the Court devised a three-pronged test for
commercial speech under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission," the Court examined whether a Public
Service Commission of New York regulation, which completely
banned an electric utility from engaging in any advertising
designed to promote the use of electricity, violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.7' The Court initially determined that
commercial speech must not be misleading or relate to unlawful
activity in order to fall under the limited protection of the
Constitution.72 Once the Court determined that the commercial
speech at issue was protected, it applied the following three-
pronged test: 1) the government must establish a substantial
interest in support of the regulation; 2) the government must
establish that the regulation on commercial speech materially
and directly advances the interest asserted; and 3) the
government must establish that the regulation is only as
extensive as is necessary to serve its interest, or is "narrowly
South Carolina adopted the findings and increased the sanction to a public repri-
mand on March 17, 1977. Id.
68. Id. at 423. The Court held that the communication in Primus was not in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain as in Ohralik. Id. The Court further held that
Primus' communication was the product of expressing personal political beliefs and
to advance the goals of the ACLU, but not to secure a financial gain as in Ohralik.
Id. The Court stated that Primus' letter "thus comes within the generous zone of
First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms." Id. at 431. The
Court stated: 'The First and Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of protec-
tion for 'advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights,' including 'advis[ing] an-
other that his legal rights have been infringed and refer[ing] him to a particular at-
torney or group of attorneys .. .for assistance." Id. at 432 (quoting NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 434, 437 (1963) (holding that activities of the NAACP are modes
of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and members cannot be prohibited from advising people of their legal rights)). Ad-
ditionally, the Court stated: "[Biroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression
are suspect, and that [pirecision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms." Id. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
69. Primus, 436 U.S. at 439. The Court emphasized that its opinion did not
prohibit regulations that do not infringe on the freedom of association of nonprofit
organizations like the NAACP or the ACLU. Id.
70. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
71. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.




In 1973, the Public Service Commission of New York (the
"Commission") banned all advertising by New York electric
utilities which promoted the use of electricity to effectively
manage fuel shortages.7' In 1977, the Commission extended its
ban and declared that all promotional advertising is contrary to
the national policy of conserving energy.75 The Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corporation challenged the ban under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.76 The Court determined that the
ban failed the third prong of the test and that a complete
suppression of advertising privileges is too extensive and is
unnecessary to accomplish the government's goals.77
In 1981, the Court examined the bounds of ethical rules in In
re R.M.J.75 The Court considered whether certain restrictions
imposed by the Supreme Court of Missouri relating to ethical
rules regulating legal advertising violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.7" R.M.J., an attorney, mailed
announcement cards to a selected list of addresses and placed
advertisements in the yellow pages of the local phone directory
and in local newspapers." The Court summarized its
73. Id. at 566-70.
74. Id. at 558-59.
75. Id. at 559. The ban was extended in a policy statement issued by the
Commission on February 25, 1977. Id. The statement placed advertising into one of
two categories: 1) promotional-advertising with the purpose to increase the purchase
of utility services, and 2) institutional and informational-advertising not intended to
promote the purchase of utility services. Id. The statement banned promotional ad-
vertising and allowed institutional and informational advertising. Id. at 559-60.
76. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560.
77. Id. at 570-71. The Commission argued that energy conservation is needed
and that advertising would aggravate inequities in utilities' rates and would raise
consumer rates. Id. at 568-69.
78. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
79. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 193-94. The rules stated that a lawyer "may 'pub-
lish . . . in newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directories' 10
categories of information: name, address and telephone number; areas of practice;
date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee
for an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and
the fixed fee to be charged for certain specified 'routine' legal services." Id. at 194
(citing Mo. REv. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR2-101(B) (1978) (Index Vol.)). The rules
also allowed a lawyer to mail a "brief professional announcement card stating new
or changed associates or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters," but
only to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Id. at 196
(citing MO. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR2-102(A)(2) (1978) (Index Vol.)).
80. Id. at 196. R.M.J. was a member of both the Missouri and Illinois Bars
and began practice as a sole practitioner in April of 1977. Id. The advertisements
placed in the phone directory and newspapers contained information that R.M.J. was
licensed in both Missouri and Illinois, that he was admitted to practice before the
United States Supreme Court, and contained a list of practice areas using different
language than that prescribed by the rules; all of which was in violation of the
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commercial speech doctrine8  and held that: 1) the
advertisement listed by the attorney was not misleading; 2) the
state failed to identify a substantial interest in prohibiting an
attorney from identifying in the advertisement the jurisdictions
where the attorney is licensed to practice; and 3) an absolute
prohibition on announcement cards to the general public is too
restrictive.82 Once again, however, the Court reserved to the
states the authority to regulate misleading advertising.83
The next consideration in this area was presented to the
Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel." The main
issue before the Court was whether a state may prohibit an
advertisement by an attorney directed at individuals with a
specific legal problem.85 Zauderer, an attorney, placed an
advertisement in a newspaper offering to represent individuals
against charges of drunk driving and promised a full refund of
legal fees if the individual was convicted of drunk driving
charges. 8 Zauderer placed a second advertisement, containing
an illustration, in thirty-six Ohio newspapers, in which he
offered to represent women who had suffered injuries as a result
of using the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. 7 The Court
rules. Id. at 196-97.
81. Id. at 203. The Court summarized its commercial speech doctrine, in the
context of professional service advertising, as such:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the ad-
vertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has
proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may im-
pose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entire-
ly. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
Id.
82. Id. at 205-06
83. ld. at 207.
84. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
85. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638. The Court also considered whether an attorney
could be restricted in the use of illustrations within an advertisement and whether a
state could require certain disclosures within the ads relating to the terms of the
fees to be involved. Id. The Court held that an attorney may not be prohibited from
using an illustration which is accurate and nondeceptive in the advertisements. Id.
at 649. The Court also held that a state could require that an attorney disclose
information relating to a client's costs and liability within an advertisement. Id. at
653.
86. Id. at 629-30.
87. Id. at 630-31. The advertisement contained an illustration of the device
and the following information:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have caused serious
pelvic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and
hysterectomies. It is also alleged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending
in abortions, miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and
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determined that a state may not prohibit an attorney from
engaging in printed advertising for the purpose of soliciting
clients when the advertising contains truthful and nondeceptive
information, and when the advertising is directed at specific
legal rights of potential clients."8
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 9 the Supreme Court
examined whether a state may prohibit an attorney from using
direct mail to solicit potential clients known to have a specific
legal problem." Shapero, a member of the Kentucky Bar,
sought approval to send a letter to potential clients who he knew
had foreclosure suits filed against them. 1 The Court held that
full-term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a similar experience do not
assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's manufacturer.
Our law firm is presently representing women on such cases. The cases are
handled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.
Id. at 631. Subsequent to the publishing of these ads, the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio filed a complaint against Zauderer charging
him with various disciplinary violations. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded
that Zauderer's actions warranted a public reprimand under Ohio's Disciplinary
Rules. Id. at 636. Zauderer contended that the rules violated the First Amendment
and his due process rights. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address the issue of whether a state may prohibit an advertisement by an attor-
ney directed at individuals with a specific legal problem. Id. at 638.
88. Id. at 647. The Court reasoned that, although the Dalkon Shield adver-
tisement by Zauderer may have been interpreted by some as being in poor taste, no
privacy rights were invaded by anyone who may have read the ads. Id. at 642. This
rationale provided the basis for the Court to distinguish this case from Ohralik. Id.
at 641.
89. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
90. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 468.
91. Id. at 469. Shapero applied to the Attorneys' Advertising Commission,
which was responsible for the regulation of attorney advertising according to the
Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court, for approval of the issuance of the letter. Id.
at 469 n.1. The letter was neither false nor misleading, but was not approved by
the Commission based on the then existent Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.135(5)(b)(i). Id. Rule 3.135(5Xb)(i) provided:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee
only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to
whom it is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is
not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or
relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.
Id. at 470 n.2. The Commission, however, voiced its opinion that the rule violated
the First Amendment, and based upon this suggestion, Shapero petitioned the Com-
mittee on Legal Ethics of the Kentucky Bar Association to determine the validity of
the rule. Id. After an advisory opinion by the Committee, the Kentucky Supreme
Court invalidated the rule and replaced it with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1984). Id. Rule 7.3 provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by
mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term 'solicit' includes contact in person,
by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communica-
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it is unconstitutional for a state to impose a blanket ban on all
direct mail solicitations to potential clients with specific known
legal needs." It was the holding in Shapero which provided a
captive legal audience for the Court's reversal in Went For It.
Before the Court was prepared to conclude as it did in Went
For It, it considered Board of Trustees v. Fox.3 The Court
considered whether state regulations on commercial speech are
required to reflect the least restrictive means to achieve a
desired end. 4 A commercial representative of a housewares
company gave a demonstration of the company's products to a
group of students on campus in a university dormitory." As a
result of the demonstration, and the representative's subsequent
refusal to cease the demonstration, the representative was
arrested by campus police." The Court concluded that
tion directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or
advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal
services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who
are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
Id. at 470-71.
92. Id. at 479-80. The Court refused to accept the state's position that there is
greater harm when a letter is targeted at specific potential clients with specific legal
problems and stated: "[T]he First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain
speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not constitutionally ban a
particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those whom it would most
interest is somehow inherently objectionable." Id. at 473-74. The Court concluded
that the mode of attorney communication is significant, and distinguished this case
from Ohralik by reasoning that a letter, unlike a lawyer, may be discarded. Id. at
475-76.
93. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 471. The State University of New York
("SUNY") had regulations regarding the use of school property, including dormitories.
Id. The regulation in question, Resolution 66-156 (1979), provided: "No authorization
will be given to private commercial enterprises to operate on State University cam-
puses or in facilities furnished by the University other than to provide for food,
legal beverages, campus bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning,
banking, barber and beautician services and cultural events." Id. at 471-72.
95. Id. at 472. In October of 1982, an American Future Systems, Inc. ("AFS")
representative gave a demonstration of the company's products in a dormitory for
students at SUNY's Cortland campus. Id AFS sold housewares (china, silverware,
etc.) to college students through "Tupperware parties" hosted by a prospective buyer
receiving some compensation; the products were demonstrated and then offered for
sale to small groups of usually 10 or more people. Id. At the October 1982
"Tupperware party," campus police attempted to stop the "party" as a violation of
Resolution 66-156. Id.
96. Id. As a result of the arrest of the representative, several students at
SUNY/Cortland, including Fox, filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that the
prohibition of students' ability to attend or host an AFS "Tupperware party" violated
the First Amendment. Id. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, but
later found for SUNY because it held that the dormitory did not constitute a public
forum for commercial activity purposes. Id. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, concluding that the state's interests were not clear, and even if these inter-
ests were clear, the restriction might not have been the least restrictive means to
1246
Recent Decisions
something short of a least-restrictive-means standard is
applicable in determining the constitutionality of state
regulation of commercial speech. 7 Thus, the framework was
complete for Went For It.
The five-to-four decision in Went For It appears to represent a
shift in the Court toward a more politically conservative
position. Within the cases discussed, there was clearly a
difference of opinion on the part of Chief Justice Rehnquist with
the rationale and conclusions of a Court more politically liberal.
Until recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist had been unable to
muster a majority for his opinions on "commercial speech," but
has been strongly supported by Justice O'Connor since her
appointment to the Court. In Went For It, however, it appears
that the Chief Justice created a majority which might possibly
have turned the Court back toward extending less First
Amendment protection to "commercial speech" and allowing
states greater latitude in regulating professions.
The Court's use of the Central Hudson test was ironic and yet
masterful as the previous dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined a majority" whose decision was based on the test.99
Justice O'Connor used the Central Hudson test and
distinguished Went For It from Shapero.' However, upon
review, the decision seems more appropriately to represent a
shifting of the majority toward the views of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.
In Virginia State Board, Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately
predicted that the rule adopted by the Court would not remain
limited to pharmacists, but rather would later be extended to
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals.01  Furthermore,
Chief Justice Rehnquist initially criticized the Court for failing
to leave such regulation to state legislatures. 2
the end. Id. at 473.
97. Id. at 477. The Court stated that to impose a least-restrictive-means
standard creates a heavy burden on states which makes illusory the Court's exten-
sion of a limited measure of protection for commercial speech. Id. The Court clarified
that the requirement for a narrow restriction in advancement of a substantial state
interest does not mandate one possible solution, but only that the regulation not
place a greater burden than necessary to achieve the state's goal. Id. at 478 (quot-
ing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1981)). Finally, the Court
stated that it has never intended that states be required to impose a restriction
which is absolutely the least severe that would achieve a desired end. Id. at 480.
That, the Court stated, is left to state decisionmakers. Id.
98. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2373.
99. Id. at 2375-76.
100. Id. at 2378-79.
101. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 783 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was an Associate Justice on the Court at
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Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to adamantly disagree with
the holdings of the Court in the area of "commercial speech"
with his dissent in Bates.' As for the Court's first
consideration of attorney commercial speech, Chief Justice
Rehnquist professed his belief that the First Amendment is
reserved for the protection of speech expressing intellectual
interest and items of public welfare, and that the First
Amendment is demeaned by invoking it to protect
advertisements for goods and services." 4  Chief Justice
Rehnquist finally replied to the Court's ruling by stating that
the Virginia State Board decision was the impetus for the Court
to establish a workable and understandable approach to
differentiating between protected and unprotected speech in the
field of advertising.0 5
Predictably, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in Ohralik,
the time of the Virginia State Bd. decision, criticized the Court for ignoring the con-
cers of the Virginia legislature in passing such restrictions on pharmacists. Id. at
784-85. The Chief Justice provided two examples to rebut the Court's reasoning. Id.
at 784. Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Black in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963) (holding that a state statute making it unlawful to engage in the
business of debt adjustment except as incident to a practice of law does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment), when he stated:
The doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitu-
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely has long since
been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judg-
ment of legislative bodies who are elected to pass laws.
Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730. Chief Justice Rehnquist also quoted from Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that a statute dealing with regulation
of visual care did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment), a case which dealt with a
prohibition on advertising for eyeglass frames when he stated: "We see no consti-
tutional reason why a State may not treat all who deal with the human eye as
members of a profession who should use no merchandising methods for obtaining
customers." Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490.
103. Bates, 433 U.S. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist again expressed his view of the First Amendment, commenting on the de-
meaning effect of this case. Id. at 404. The Chief Justice declared that regardless of
the truthfilness or reasonableness of the advertisement, it still fell outside of the
protection accorded by the majority in Bates. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated
returning to the endorsement of the rationale in Valentine. Id. at 405.
104. See supra notes 52-57 for a discussion of Bates. Bates was the first deci-
sion in which the Court considered the application of the First Amendment to adver-
tising by an attorney. Bates, 433 U.S. at 353. Chief Justice Rehnquist further stated
that regardless of the quality, reasonableness or truthfulness of an advertisement, it
was not what the Framers of the First Amendment had in mind for its protection.
Id. at 404-05.
105. Bates, 433 U.S. at 405. Chief Justice Rehnquist further declared that once
the Court deviated from the established rule in Valentine, the shift to a case-by-case
assessment of First Amendment claims was inevitable. Id. Finally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist simply refused to endorse the opinion that any forms of legal advertising
have constitutional protection. Id.
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which held that there can be no constitutional protection for a
lawyer who solicits legal clients for pecuniary gain in a direct
person-to-person manner."6 Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented in Primus, which held that a lawyer may contact a
potential client in a person-to-person manner if the lawyer's
incentive is not a pure pecuniary interest, but rather the
advancement of a political agenda.0 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Central Hudson clearly
directed attention to the misapplication of the First Amendment
by the Court."~ The Chief Justice discussed the illogical
conclusion of the Court that the speech of a state-created
monopoly, itself the subject of a comprehensive state scheme of
regulation, may be protected by the First Amendment.'
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court again for its
failure to properly place this speech in the subordinate position
of commercial speech with very limited First Amendment
protection."0
Zauderer provided the first opportunity for Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor to express similar views in
dissent to the Court's application of precedent."' Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that the use
of "unsolicited legal advice to entice clients" provided "enough of
a risk of overreaching and undue influence" to allow Ohio's ban
on such activity." Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor applied a strong state interest rationale.
Justice O'Connor stated that states may determine in a
reasonable manner that unsolicited legal advice poses a
sufficient threat to the substantial state interests to the extent
that a blanket prohibition is not unwarranted.' Additionally,
the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor found a substantial state
106. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 477 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
107. Primus, 436 U.S. at 440 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 589. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "I thought by now it had be-
come well established that a State has broad discretion in imposing economic regula-
tions." Id. (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that a state
may fix the selling price of milk)).
111. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 673 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J., dis-
senting).
112. Id. Justice O'Connor applied a comparison between the speech in contro-
versy and merchants commonly offering free samples of their products to entice busi-
ness. Id. Justice O'Connor was troubled when the product being peddled as samples
is professional advice. Id. at 673-74. Justice O'Connor stated: "The States under-
standably require more of attorneys than of others engaged in commerce." Id. at
676.
113. Id. at 678.
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interest in the requirement that licensed lawyers exercise
independent professional judgment on a consistent basis in order
to best serve their clients.""
In 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia dissented in Shapero. "5 It was this dissent which
provided the culmination of Chief Justice Rehnquist's criticism
of the Court's handling of this line of cases, and also provided
the basis for the majority opinion in Went For It. The dissent
addressed all of the prior criticisms, including the rights of the
states to regulate professions,"' the substantial interests
states have in maintaining high professional standards"7 and
the inappropriate extension of the First Amendment to
"commercial speech" which dilutes the power of the First
Amendment's protection."8 Additionally, it was in this dissent
that Justice O'Connor advocated the use of the Central Hudson
114. Id. The dissenters feared that the allowance of advice in advertisements
would lead attorneys to advertise advice which would be most likely to bring in cli-
ents, rather than advertise advice which the client may need to know. Id.
115. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia, J.J., dis-
senting).
116. Id. at 481. The dissent declared that Bates was nothing but an early ex-
periment, and one which should be reexamined because it has proved to be prob-
lematic in determining the constitutional parameters of commercial speech. Id. at
487. Likewise, the dissent declared:
[We should now return to the States the legislative function that has so inap-
propriately been taken from them in the context of attorney advertising. The
Central Hudson test for commercial speech provides an adequate doctrinal
basis for doing so, and today's decision confirms the need to reconsider Bates
in the light of that doctrine.
Id.
117. Id. at 481. The dissent declared: "The advice contained in unsolicited 'free
samples' is likely to be colored by the lawyer's own interest in drumming up busi-
ness, a result that is sure to undermine the professional standards that States have
a substantial interest in maintaining." Id. In demonstrating what the dissent be-
lieved to be a substantial state interest under what has been determined by it to be
an unworkable standard, the dissent stated: "The roots of the error in our attorney
advertising cases are a defective analogy between professional services and stan-
dardized consumer products and a correspondingly inappropriate skepticism about
the States' justifications for their regulations." Id. at 487. The dissent believed that
regulation of lawyers and special ethical standards are understood, and properly so,
to be appropriate in restraining lawyers in the exercise of their unique power grant-
ed by the political system in which our law operates. Id. at 489. Finally, the dissent
declared:
[T]his Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic belief that "consumers," and
thus our Nation, will benefit from a constitutional theory that refuses to rec-
ognize either the essence of professionalism or its fragile and necessary foun-
dations. In one way or another, time will uncover the folly of this approach. I
can only hope the Court will recognize the danger before it is too late to ef-
fect a worthwhile cure.
Id. at 491.
118. Id. at 483.
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three-pronged test to determine the outcome of commercial
speech cases."' The reasoning in the dissent provided a
reasonable and well-examined majority opinion in Went For It.
The Went For It opinion is an opinion which leaves no bases
uncovered. The Court clearly established the relationship
between lawyer advertising, commercial speech and the First
Amendment protections thus afforded it.' The Court outlined
the Central Hudson test, and then applied it carefully and
meticulously to the facts of the case, including distinguishing the
case from others which may have led to confusion or further
debate. 1' The Court used prior case law and constitutional
parameters and weaved them into a common sense approach to
regulating attorney speech which neither closes the avenues to
which an attorney could procure business, nor denies states the
ability to establish professional standards to insure the positive
practice and perception of its professionals. The Bates line of
cases and its rationale have regressed to the reasoning of
Valentine. Commercial speech regulation has been returned to
the state legislatures and the strictest constitutional protections
have been reserved for speech which truly exists to encourage
debate and disseminate information and opinion in the area of
public interest
The fallout from Went For It could be substantial. The
decision opens the door for states to regulate lawyers and other
service-oriented professions, such as physicians, in areas of
advertising and client contact. The acceptance by the Court of
the Florida survey purporting to prove the substantial state
interest alleged by the Florida Bar signals a greater acceptance
119. Id. at 485. The dissent reasoned that an application of the Central Hudson
test to attorney direct-mail solicitation demonstrates that states have a substantial
interest in preventing what could easily be misleading effects of the targeted direct
mail. Id. at 486. The dissent reasoned that such direct-mail solicitation might also
have a corrosive effect on professional standards. Id.
120. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. The Court declared: "[Clommercial speech
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of First Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." Id. at 2375
(quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)).
121. Id. at 2376. The Court went to great lengths to establish the "substantial
interest" of the State of Florida, by lending great weight to the unrebutted findings
of the two year study on the effects of lawyer advertising. Id. at 2377-78. The Court
also took a special look at Shapero, and declared that the Court in Shapero took a
very casual approach to the interest of protecting the privacy of individuals who
were the targets of direct-mail solicitation. Id. at 2378. In Went For It, the Court
reasoned, the Florida Bar had made the proper argument concerning the interest in
protecting the privacy rights of individuals and the Court refused to take a casual
approach to what it considered to be a substantial state interest. Id. at 2379.
1996 1251
Duquesne Law Review
by the Court of states' desires to protect their citizens, in
conjunction with their professionals, from the degradation of
such professions, based on the public's perception. Undoubtedly,
state courts nationwide will be faced with proposals from State
Bar Associations or other professional regulating organizations
which attempt to regulate stricter guidelines over the practices
of their professionals in the area of advertising and public
perception.
Clearly, the Florida survey provided a disturbing realization
for members of the legal profession. Contrary to the aspirations
of the profession, lawyers are not generally perceived to be the
protectors of rights or the upholders of justice. Rather, the
general public exhibits an attitude of great disfavor toward the
legal profession. Of course, it is beyond consideration that the
First Amendment could be precluded by the public's perception
of what is right and wrong. To do so would be to thwart the
spirit of the First Amendment. Likewise, to apply the First
Amendment to every form of speech would also thwart that
spirit. It is for this reason that the Court was correct in denying
the full protection of the First Amendment to the speech in Went
For It.
The Court refused to extend the full protection of the First
Amendment to direct-mail solicitation of legal clients within
thirty days of an accident. The Court correctly weighed the
interests of states in protecting those individuals who are the
victims of great tragedies from the direct realization that their
pain involves a monetary figure. It would be improper, even
inhuman, to find it overburdensome to restrict any profession for
thirty days in order to protect the privacy of an individual when
it is needed most, especially when what is restricted is a
business solicitation. Although the implications of this decision
will not be determined for some time, the legal profession can
only benefit from such regulations, which may finally sway
public opinion toward attorneys.
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